The fascination with Heidegger’s thinking is based primarily on this religious undertone of an epochal and eschatological consciousness…. How distant is this eschatological-historical thinking, for which everything counts merely as seed-sowing and preparation for an arriving future, from the original wisdom of the Greeks, for whom the history of time was philosophically insignificant because they directed their view toward eternal beings…. Karl Lowith [Heidegger, p.39]

1. Introduction: Education for Character

In an earlier work I argued that for a liberal democratic nation-state to retain its freedoms, education should be treated as a ‘natural right’ [Vasillopulos, ‘Natural’]. This thesis implied more than ‘education for citizenship,’ because ‘citizenship’ too easily can become subordinate to the power political needs of the nation-state, especially when education, public and private, is increasingly dependent upon public funds. ‘Education for character’ is necessary, I argued, to supplement education for skills (skill and drill), to enable an informed citizenry to earn a living and to exercise its freedoms, both natural and civil. A free and prosperous market economy requires free and well trained young people. Only then can they take their place in the world as active contributors to the economy and participants in the polity. And only then could they hope to retain their natural rights.

As I write this synopsis, I am struck by its seeming platitudes. Who is against character? Who is against natural and civil rights? The truth is that, even in liberal democracies, many (sometimes I believe majorities) are willing to subordinate their rights to economic success or to secure political favor. Moreover, in a secular age many people find their only sense of transcendence, their only escape from ‘getting and spending,’ in the religiosity of the nation. What is true for liberal regimes is a fortiori true in autocratic ones. Again a commonplace. Yet it must be remembered that platitudes and commonplaces are often honored in the breach. They often no longer become themselves as in their absence. Character and natural rights, archetypal endowments of individuals, are under constant assault by those elements of the nation-state which benefit from a frightened or desperate citizenry. I am saying more than it is difficult for individuals to balance multiple needs and values, often conflicting, in the context of modern social and political orders. The individual often finds him/herself under assault by these orders. There are nearly incessant demands for the individual to subordinate his/her goals to family, society, or nation. I am not suggesting that it is always improper for an individual to consider decisions in the context of ‘extra-individual’ values. I am suggesting that the locus of these considerations must remain within the individual. In other words, in a liberal society based on natural rights, only the individual can properly balance the competing claims made on his/her time, talent and energies. To do otherwise succumbs to duress or coercion, whether physical, mental or spiritual. Framed this sharply, it is not difficult to understand why education for character in a context of natural rights has many enemies and suffers assaults from many quarters. That its opponents fly the banner of ‘social justice,’ ‘social obligation,’ or one or another form of ‘group rights,’ or ‘service to the nation or society,’ or some other form of commutarian or patriotic values, like the Aryan race, serves only to mask the anti-individual basis of these attacks. Again, I am not contesting the value of these claims, but only their imposition on an
individual. The very attractiveness of these masks indicates how essential education for character is, for only well-informed and mentally secure individuals have a hope of resisting the imposition of such values.

To illustrate this point this essay presents the educational views of Martin Heidegger, whom many believe, to be the most important philosopher of the twentieth century. His views transcended educational theorizing, for Heidegger became rector of a prestigious German university. In this leadership position of educational ‘philosopher/king,’ he proposed to reconstitute the German university system, beginning with his own, in terms of eternal values. He was given this opportunity by Adolph Hitler.

Anticipating criticism, I am aware that I am dealing with an extreme case, one which may seem remote from educational systems in liberal democratic regimes. Yet I ask the reader to suspend judgment and be open to the question, ‘is it really so remote?’ Was Heidegger's effort so different from educational systems that spend so much time on ‘skill and drill’ and on socializing for conformity and obedience to authorities? And so little effort on educating for character in the context of natural and civil rights? After all, education for character places the locus of choice in the individual, not the family, the society or the polity. And do not natural and civil rights mean, at least in theory, that the individual is impervious to government restrictions on life, liberty and property without due process, that is, judicial sanction? In short, neither character nor natural and civil rights imply obedience to, much less reverence for, the nation-state. Education for character in the context of natural rights creates a powerful basis for resistance to all authority, including the nation-state. Such resistance arouses a host of enemies, some of whom proclaim liberal credentials. From this perspective Heidegger’s educational objectives may not seem so extreme. Who, after all is against education for eternal truth?

My discussion of Heidegger begins with a ‘prologue’ to my analysis of Heidegger’s famous ‘Rectoral address.’ It will help us understand how seriously Heidegger took his philosophy and how relevant he believed it to the reformation, in his words, the ‘spiritualization,’ of the German university.

2. Prologue: Heideggerian Musings

Language and Becoming

Can I say that I am becoming through the language of my poem? No, but not perhaps for the reason which may leap to mind—something like, ‘I am I’ or ‘I make the poem’ or ‘I, by the use of my language, make the poem’ or ‘I make the poem, and, therefore, become a poet, becoming myself.’ All these statements are false, because they misunderstand the nature of language. Language makes the poem. The poet is but its instrument, ready to hand, more or less. When I listen to the appeal of language, when I dwell in the language, language is ready to use me to make its poem. Better, but not quite sufficient. For something happens to the instrument which denies its instrumentality. The poem is not the poem; the instrument is not the instrument. My poem is not mine. Language is not my instrument. But neither am I its instrument, notwithstanding that language uses me to reveal the poem, not to make it. The poem dwells in the language. If I dwell in it, as well, I may be a poet. When I dwell in the language, language is ready to use me to make its poem. Better, but not quite sufficient. For something happens to the instrument which denies its instrumentality. The poem is not the poem; the instrument is not the instrument. My poem is not mine. Language is not my instrument. But neither am I its instrument, notwithstanding that language uses me to reveal the poem, not to make it. The poem dwells in the language. If I dwell in it, as well, I may be a poet. When I dwell in the same space as the particular poem, language uses me to reveal it. Then, am I but the workman who stumbles upon a coin? Can reveal only mean cleaning dirt off a coin? Is there no less contingent relationship between me and the poem I reveal or is revealed through me? Has it become my poem, at least slightly, since I discovered it? My treasure? Not in the sense of my possession, for poems cannot be possessed. Yet, is it not significant that I found the poem? Surely, this must signify some non-contingent relationship between me and what I found. Do I not differ from those who did not find it? Yes, perhaps, but how much does this matter? For, all it may say is that the one who did not or could not find it did not listen to the appeal of language with respect to the particular poem that dwelt within language at that particular moment. Yes, but I did listen. I heard the appeal; I dwelt in the language at that moment. There must be a connection more important than stumbling on a coin. If so, perhaps in reverse. The treasure stumbled on me. The
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language heard my appeal. It listened to me in the one precise moment and found me a useful instrument. As I did not make the poem by listening to the appeal of language, language did not make the poet by listening to my appeal. Yet, if the poem became revealed by me, then can I not say that I was revealed by the poem? Can I not say that I dwelt in the language with the poem? Can I not say that the language dwelt in me with the poem [Heidegger, *Poetry*]?

Ajax Hero Artist

Ajax, it will be remembered, while attempting to revenge himself, was intoxicated by Athena and shamefully slaughtered cattle instead of Agamemnon and Menelaus [Vasillopulos, ‘Ajax’]. Unable to live with this act, he killed himself. It may seem absurd to conceive of Ajax as an artist. What does he create? What is his medium? The short answer is that he creates himself, by conceiving himself a hero. He is his own work of art. Consider this notion in the light of the relationship of language and poetry, the poet and the poem. The poet creates (or reveals) the poem and equally the poem creates (or reveals) the poet, because they dwell in the same moment in a particular language. To put this in heroic language, both Heideggerian and Nietzschean, the poem is as willed as the poet and as willing. Art is located in both of them, not each of them, for poet and poem exist only as part of a willed/willing dyad. Art, it may be more precise to say, dwells in this willed/willing relationship. Note the ambivalence of ‘willing.’ The willer, the person or thing that wills, and the person who accommodates will, who is willing to be willed. So long as this ambivalence is honored, so long as one is not merely willed, the object of another’s willing, so long as one is willing, able to accept being willed and able to reject being willed, all is well.

And Ajax? As a hero Ajax lives (or is spawned by) his heroic acts. Ajax’s willed acts will Ajax into existence. The heroic act of Ajax’s willing, in both senses, create Ajax, enabling Ajax to unconceal of himself and become unconcealed to us. His shameful acts in response to the unjust allocation of Achilles’s armor, therefore, amounts to a willful self-denial of Ajax the Hero, of Ajax who is his heroic deeds. The injustice of Agamemnon’s decision diminishes Ajax, for it asserts that a lesser hero is the greater, Ajax must set things right, for he cannot be Ajax and accept his diminution. To accept the allocation makes him an unwilling person, leaving him as a willed subject, acted upon merely and solely. Athena reinforces his abject status, by making it clear to all that Ajax has been willed, acted upon, by her superior willingness or will to power. Worse, by intoxicating him, she causes (wills) him to act in a shameful manner, a process which undermines further Ajax’s self-conception and self-creation. Is Athena Parthenos making another point as well? First, Ajax is the object of her will; second, he is willed to act anti-heroically, becoming anti-Ajax in two senses. It matters not in the least that the god, Athena, has superior will. Her divine power is heroically irrelevant to Ajax. Heroes overcome their adversaries, human or divine, or they lose their status, their self-conception, themselves. It they cannot overcome being willed upon, they cannot be self-conceived, self-willed, self-willing. Life as a willed creature cannot be countenanced, much less tolerated, by a hero. If a hero cannot conceive (create) himself, by his willing actions, he cannot conceive (imagine) of his existence. Ajax kills himself, his willing act, an effort to expunge Ajax the willed upon. Suicide is his ultimate assertion or reassertion of his self-conception.

Ajax Parthenos.

Leader Volk Spiritual Mission

What is pregiven to the Leader and how it is given so that it can be regiven to the spiritual Nation as its mission are critical to the process of revealing the mission and empowering the Leader, by revealing how he is embodied in the Volk. As the poem dwells in the language, the Leader dwells in his people; the Fuehrer in his Volk, for the Volk entails its mission, its destiny. Similarly, to the degree of his authenticity, the Volk is revealed in him, becoming unimaginable without him. Once unconcealed, once shorn of its encrustations of thoughtlessness, habits, customs, by ceaseless struggle, Eris, the Volk Leader then presents, reveals, incarnates the new Volk, now spiritualized in the form of its mission. Yet, to the degree that this formulation suggests Time, by employing the terms ‘becomes,’ ‘now,’ ‘once,’ and ‘ceaseless,’ it misses the simultaneity, the immanence, the enfoldedness of these ideas in an ever-present,
but concealed, moment. The spiritual mission has always dwelt in the *Volk*. The Beginning and the End are an identity, the true nature of which is revealed by the Leader who dwells in the *Volk*. The more truth there is, or rather, the more, by our confrontation with What Is in its totality, is unconcealed: *Volk* Leader Spirit Mission. The more immanent truth there is in this manifold, the less Time is seen as part of its nature.

The assumption of the rectorate is the commitment to the *spiritual* leadership of this institution of higher learning. Heidegger ['Rectoral,' p. 5]

3. The Rectoral Address March 1933

The ideas written in a Heideggerian manner in the Prologue were not intended to represent Heidegger’s ideas, though, I hope, their provenance is clear. They were presented to illustrate how a philosophical turn can be given to many ideas current in German thought in the century leading up to the Third Reich. Consider the many ideas, convictions, values, and predispositions Heidegger shares with Thomas Mann [Mann]: (1) that there is a substantive difference between the German and other European nations, which includes elites and ordinary people; (2) that there is a substantive difference between the German language and other European languages, especially marked in the Romance languages; (3) that there is an antagonism to the Roman and Latin world and a love of Greece; (4) that there is a frank appreciation of the value of conflict, including war, rather than an attachment to violence for its own sake; (5) that there is a contempt for the material, the shallow, the trivial, the decadent, and the West in general; (6) that there is a special spiritual mission of the German Nation. This far from complete list is sufficient to indicate more than the many affinities between the great novelist and the great philosopher. It is to show that many ideas, values, convictions, and predispositions antedated the rise of Hitler, ideas that found adherents who were not National Socialists.

But Heidegger for a time was an enthusiastic supporter the Hitler Movement. Unlike Thomas Mann and many others, equally critical of Western thinking, he did not leave Germany in protest. The weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that Heidegger, until perhaps the late 1930s, believed that the Hitler Movement offered the best chance to transform Germany along *his* lines. Neither a careerist nor an opportunist, he supported the Third Reich, because he believed Hitler offered Germany its one best hope to fulfill its spiritual mission. So it becomes essential to examine Case Heidegger [Ricci, Wolin]. Let me make some disavowals. I am not interested in indicting Heidegger or in debunking his philosophy via his political activities. Not only is this project highly dubious, it is irrelevant to my purpose: to explain the affinities that so many elites, including some of the world’s most brilliant people, had for National Socialism, Hitler, and his Movement. Let me also say, it is incomprehensible that anyone having the most cursory acquaintance with Heidegger’s writing can believe that his philosophy *derived* from the Hitler Movement’s ideology or that he learned anything at all from it. He did, however, believe that the Movement provided an opportunity to have his vision for the German university actualized. An opportunity he had to chance, because, like Plato at Syracuse, the call to life, the call to live one’s philosophy, was too tempting to ignore. Unlike Plato, who thought he could transform a dictator, and thereby his *polis*, Heidegger thought he could transform his university and, by so doing, spiritualize the German Nation. Though this project failed, Heidegger went to his grave believing in its value. That Heidegger was naïve is hardly surprising. That he was naïve to the extent that he believed he could infuse the Hitler Movement with his philosophy is astounding, but perhaps not to those familiar with the delusions of professors.

In the midst of Hitler mania, Heidegger became Rector of Freiburg University, his Rectoral Address becoming a document of the Hitler Movement. The Address remains deeply controversial. My purpose is not resolve the controversy but to analyze why Heidegger believed in the Hitler Movement. Profoundly German in its essence, not merely in its nationalist assertions of the superior character of the German language and culture—many nationalisms make similar claims—only a German rector would make so
many demands on his audience. As Thomas Mann and countless other Germans have said, ‘to think philosophically is to think in German.’ Heidegger’s address suggests that to be an educated German is to be a philosopher. Moreover, the Address serves as a prolegomena to the Hitler Movement’s political theology.

In Heidegger’s view: To perform its great mission, the German university must be ‘self-administered,’ but this cannot happen without understanding German students and teachers. He asks, ‘Can we know all this without the most constant and unspiring self-examination [Heidegger, ‘Rectoral,’ pp.5-6].’ This self-critical, unrelenting process reveals not only the essence of students and teachers but the ‘primordial common will [of the German university] to its essence…. The will to the essence of the German university is the will to science as will to the historical spiritual mission of the German people as a people that knows itself in its State [Heidegger, ‘Rectoral,’p.6].’ This remarkable idea needs some discussion, for it counters one of the most hallowed notions of education. The unexamined life has not been considered worth living since Socrates, if not before. The purpose of this life is, however, not to serve the State, nor to serve a historical mission of a people, but to lead a good, virtuous, and just life. While this could not be accomplished outside the polis, the polis should not be conceived as a State with a historical mission or as a modern State at all. The polis did not have a will, primordial or otherwise, to its essence. My point is not to contrast Greek notions of the educated life with the German, but to indicate how far a great student of Greek thought like Heidegger could miss the mark, despite believing he was getting back to ‘the beginning of our spiritual-historical existence…. This beginning is the departure, the setting out, of Greek philosophy. Here, for the first time, Western man rises up, from a base in popular culture [Volkstum] and by means of his language, against the totality of What Is and questions and comprehends it as the being that it is [Heidegger, ‘Rectoral,’pp.6-7].

Heidegger’s concept of the ‘beginning’ lies at the heart of his philosophy. While the beginning stands before in Time, it also stands before us in Space, that is, in front of us, confronting us. In this respect, the beginning still is and always must be before us. Greek thought is the beginning for Heidegger, not only because it is the ‘first’ thought to use the totality of What Is and the method of relentless Questioning to keep the What Is, in both senses, before us. The Greeks discovered thought in their language. They became Greeks because of Greek, and Greek became Greek because of the Greeks. By this process of self-discovery or self-un concealing, they revealed the What Is and what always has been. In this sense, the Greeks did not develop from a non-Greek line of thinkers; they were the first people to think at all. They were the beginning of thought, because they were the first to confront the totality of the What Is with relentless Questioning. It must be kept in mind that the Questioning and the Whats are part of the same idea, separable only heuristically. Without Questioning there can be no What Is; without the What Is, there can be no Questioning. Therefore, not only were the Greeks the first people to think, they were the first or primordial people. Other human beings have been trapped or suspended in Time, moving from event to event mindlessly, under the power of necessity without being aware of their thrall dom. Such people have been colloid al, not primordial. They could not confront the What Is, because their languages did not embed the Questioning. Therefore, the What Is remained concealed. Necessity may be stronger than knowledge. But knowing or Questioning reveals it, names it, and limits it, by placing it within the language and the language within it.

Supposing the plausibility of this reading of Heidegger, it remains difficult to accept that Heidegger faced the Greeks in all their totality of what they were. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger ignored the centrality of the polis to Greek philosophy, a process only partially justified by their appeal to the Pre-Socratics. Unlike Nietzsche, Heidegger substituted the State for the polis. Then, he compounded the distortion by imbuing the State with a spiritual-historical mission. He further elaborated this idea: ‘For the Greeks, science is not a cultural asset but the innermost determining center of all popular and national existence. The Greeks thought science not merely a means of bringing the unconscious to consciousness, but the power that hones and encompasses all existence’ [Heidegger, ‘Rectoral,’p.7]. Moreover: ‘Then this will to essence will create for our people its world of the innermost and most extreme danger, i.e., its truly spiritual
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world…. And the spiritual world of a people is not the superstructure of a culture any more than it is an armory filled with useful information and values; it is the power that most deeply preserves the people’s earth-and blood-bound strengths as the power that most deeply arouses and most profoundly shakes the people’s existence. Only a spiritual world guarantees the people greatness’ [Heidegger, ‘Rectoral,’ p.9].

Can one imagine Pericles uttering such sentences? Can one imagine Aeschylus, whom Heidegger quotes in his Address, making these points? ‘Knowing, however, is far weaker than necessity’ [Aeschylus, Prometheus, ln.514]. Heidegger amplifies, ‘That means that all knowing about things has always already been surrendered to the predominance of destiny and falls before it.’ Without denying the power of necessity, it is difficult to see how Aeschylus suggested, especially through Prometheus, that humans must surrender to the predominance of destiny or necessity. Prometheus is chained to his rock, not because he surrendered but because he defied the gods to serve man, becoming himself. Can anyone believe that Aeschylus suggested that Prometheus should have done otherwise? Or that he should have recanted? There is a great deal of difference between surrendering and going down fighting. Is not fulfilling one’s destiny, defiantly and without apology or regret, what Eris is all about, as Heidegger and Nietzsche repeatedly made clear? Necessity, for Prometheus, and countless other Greek heroes, historical or mythological, meant that one must be who one is, the consequences be damned. All other necessities must be confronted. Surely, Nietzsche concurs with the tragedians in this. Necessity should be defied not kowtowed to.

There is another issue. Heidegger believed that the Germans, following the Greeks, could will themselves to their essence as a spiritual people and that it was no coincidence that only these two peoples—the only Nations able to confront and question the What Is because of the power of their languages to reveal to the people their spiritual-historical mission—have appreciated the power of necessity. While Germans may have been a people whose spirituality enabled them to subordinate knowledge to necessity, it is a far different matter to so conceive the Greeks. The most that can be said, if Greeks are to be the primordial precursors of Germans, is that knowing of necessity (in the sense of being aware) may allow a people to dwell in necessity, as they dwell in the language which unconceals necessity. Knowing, reason, and logic, all bundled in Logos, define Greek manhood, not just Greek thought. A Greek may be defeated by necessity, or fate, or the will of a god, but he will never submit himself to it. I realize Heidegger believed he dealt with this and similar objections by preferring the pre-Socratics to Plato and Aristotle. My view is that he pushes the distinction too far. Moreover, when he referred to ‘The Greeks,’ if he meant only the pre-Socratics, he should have said so.

At all events, when a great thinker, like Heidegger or Nietzsche, distorts, wittingly or not, the views, values, or ideas of another person or culture, one must ask why? Nietzsche ignored the polis, in his call to recapitulate as much of Greek society as possible in mid to late nineteenth century Germany [Vasillopulos, ‘Passionate’]. Having no possibility of recreating the polis, the best that could be done was to transform (or allow the self-transformation) citizens into artists. Heidegger reconceived the polis, without mentioning it, into the spiritual-historical State. Where Nietzsche tried to create the conditions under which individuals could express themselves in their full natures, Apollonian and Dionysian, despite the constraints of modern society, Heidegger tried to create conditions under which Germans could fulfill their destiny within the confines of the spiritualized State. One of the most important elements of this process entailed the spiritualization of the German university.

Implying a major recasting of the university, Heidegger did not shrink from the difficulties of his project: ‘Instead of giving oneself over to the universal enterprise of education, as if one had been given the mission of saving the culture, one must [engage in] a radical dismantling and rebuilding or a destruction…without concerning oneself with idle talk of those sensible and enterprising people who reckon time with clocks’ [Lowith, p.18]. Learning is no longer for learning’s sake; its purpose is to preserve ‘the people’s earth- and blood-bound strengths as the power that most deeply arouses and shakes the people’s existence’ [Heidegger, ‘Rectoral,’p.9]. Academic specialties will have to be reordered to
achieve this objective. Under the relentless force of ‘questioning’ that ‘unfolds its most authentic strength to unlock the essential in all things…the encapsulation of the sciences in separated specialties [is shattered and thus] brings back from their boundless and aimless dispersal in individual fields and corners, and directly exposes science once again to the productivity and blessing of all world-shaping powers of human-historical existence, such as nature, history, language; people, custom, state; poetry, thought, faith; disease, madness, death; law, economy, technology’ [Heidegger, ‘Rectoral,’ p.9].  It is easy to sympathize with Heidegger's impatience with specialization. More than one critic has complained that academics know more and more about less and less. His emphasis on questioning as a means and form of knowing is also consonant with many well thought out notions of liberal education. Yet, for all the attractiveness of his ideas, their nationalistic context, inevitably condoning, if not idealizing violence, makes Western scholars shudder. Lowith echoes this combination and attraction and repulsion: ‘Nobody will be able to dispute that Heidegger is more perceptive than practically any other contemporary interpreter, that he is an expert in the art of reading and interpreting when it comes to carefully taking apart an intellectual or poetic system of language and assembling it anew. But neither will anyone be able to overlook the violence of his interpreting’ [L owith, p.106]. Moreover, nationalism and academic freedom are incompatible, as Heidegger candidly granted: ‘The much lauded academic freedom will be expelled from the German university; for this freedom was not genuine because it was only negative. It primarily meant a lack of concern, arbitrariness of intentions and inclinations, lack of restraint in what was done and left undone’ [Heidegger, ‘Rectoral,’ p.10]. This view is, of course, negative in the sense that liberty does not empower the scholar to do; it does not include the freedomto [Berlin]. Yet in the context of the modern power State, the freedomfrom should not be so casually disparaged. Academic freedom, for all its possible abuses, including irresponsibility to the larger society, must be honored, because it conditions the freedom to do research, to learn, and to teach without the interference of the power State. The responsibility of the university cannot be to the State, however it is disguised as the destiny of the spiritual people. It must be to learning itself, to the relentless questioning and the confrontation with the

4. Concluding Comments

I began this essay with platitudes, and much as I would like to avoid concluding with similar platitudes, I find that I cannot. My justification is that my analysis of Heidegger’s assault on democratic education will make these platitudes seem worth reiterating, if only because the most highly educated nation in Europe rose up against them in the name of a racist ideology. I doubt that Heidegger was a racist, at least not of the homicidal sort, nevertheless he lent his enormous prestige to a regime that was. And a perusal of current neo-Nazi or white supremacist web sites, which number in the hundreds of thousands, are not reason for complacency. Free education, like freedom itself, is always under attack. It seems chaotic in a world longing for order. It seems relativistic in a world longing for the certainty of simple answers. It seems ephemeral in a world longing for the security of permanent values. It seems shallow in a world longing for transcendent truth. And so on, with the familiar litany of contemporary criticism of the world and its institutions, including education at all levels. Of course, much of this criticism has a point.
Education cannot be reduced to ‘skill and drill,’ without disarming students of their ability to consider the values which underlay their educational experiences. After World War II, Germans, upon being interviewed by the victors, answered that their education, which was second to none in its transfer of skills, ignored critical reasoning. So allow me to add to the platitude of education the concept of critical reasoning. Skills are important. Discipline is important. An appreciation of authority is essential. All these truths, however, are subject to the most hideous criminal abuse when allowed to operate as if they were self-justifying and beyond reproach.

If one of the most brilliant men of the twentieth century failed to appreciate the necessity for freedom and free critical inquiry on the part of instructors and students alike, it seems incumbent on us to reiterate the values of freedom, however platitudinous, and warn of the dangers of unquestioned obedience to superiors, however brilliant.

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