Observations on Encoding Stance by Means of Modality Morphemes in the Statements of Defendants within the Context of Turkey's Inquisitorial Court System

By

Elçin Esmer
Department of English Language Teaching, Faculty of Education,
Mersin University, Mersin, Turkey.

Abstract

This study aims to describe the stances of text producers (in this case, defendants) towards the knowledge content presented in their statements by examining the distribution of modality morphemes showing stances in the defendants' statements in the records of court hearings. In line with the aim of the study, the research has a descriptive survey design, using qualitative and quantitative approaches. The data for the study involve 50 records of court hearings obtained from various law firms. For the data analysis portion of the study, the finite verbs in the statements by the defendants were extracted and entered into the NooJ corpus-processing system. Qualitative and quantitative analyses were conducted based on Chafe's (1986) model of knowledge types and Sargın's (2014) classification of Turkish modality morphemes. The results reveal that the -DI, -DIr, -mIşDI, -mAktaDIr and -ıyorDI modality morphemes indicating high certainty and strong evidence are used at a high rate in the statements by defendants. It can be concluded that the text producer agreed completely with the accuracy of information presented in his or her statement.

Keywords: *Court hearing record, defendant statement, modality, stance*

1.   Introduction

In the literature, Franz Boas (1938) is credited with conducting the first known study on the notion of evidentiality, or the function of linguistic units as a reflection of the text producers' opinions and evaluations; in other words, the stances they have on a given proposition (Kareem, 2008). Following Boas' seminal research on linguistic units, numerous studies have been conducted on the application of different terms related to this subject, such as evaluation (Hunston & Thompson, 2000), hedging (Hyland, 1996), evidentiality (Chafe & Nichols, 1986) and stance (Biber & Finegan, 1989; Biber, 2004). In these studies, emphasis was placed on the idea that the stances of text producers can also be expressed in languages through grammatical and lexical means and intonations, gestures and facial expressions, and that stance could be regarded as a modality category (Chafe & Nichols, 1986; Biber & Finegan, 1989; Palmer, 1986, 2001; Biber, 2004). However, the function of stance as a modality category differs semantically in these studies.

Modality, which is an action category pertaining to items such as time or appearance, and which marks the stance of the producer, includes two sub-categories: epistemicity and evidentiality modalities (Palmer 1986, 2001; Aikhenvald, 2004; Özmen Veld, 2006; Corcu Gül, 2010; Sargın, 2014). In the literature, some studies (Lyons, 1977; Keisanen, 2007) associate the stance of the text producer towards a proposition with the epistemicity sub-category of modality, which indicates the stance of producers towards the accuracy and reality of a proposition (Kareem, 2008; Szczyrbak, 2014).

Linguists such as Willet (1988), Faller (2002), Aikhenvald (2004) and de Haan (2005) have focused on the evidentiality modality, which indicates the text producer's evidence about the reality of a proposition. According to these linguists, evidentiality modality and epistemicity modality are independent categories, with evidentiality modality showing the knowledge source of a proposition, and epistemicity modality assessing the knowledge presented in the proposition in terms of reality and accuracy.

According to Chafe (1986), Palmer (1986, 2001), Kratzer (1982)**,** Izvorski (1997) and Dendale and Tasmowski (2001), the type of evidence for the information stated by the text producer in his or her statement affects the way the producer presents the accuracy and reality of the proposition. Therefore, epistemicity and evidentiality modalities are closely related terms, with evidentiality modality being a sub-type of epistemicity modality. Furthermore, linguists such as Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007) and Szczyrbak (2014) stated that the evidentiality and epistemicity modalities could also be located under the term stance suggested by Biber and Finegan (1989). In the present study, as the approach that regards evidentially modality as a sub-category of epistemicity modality was adopted, and the term stance was used instead of the terms evidentially and epistemicity.

Studies that have regarded evidentially as a sub-type of epistemicity modality have emphasised that the type of evidence affects the text producer's agreement with the accuracy of a proposition, and that the types of evidence are assessed differently in terms of their reliability. The literature features numerous studies conducted on the classification of evidence types (Chafe, 1986; Palmer, 1986, 2001; Willet, 1988; Frawley, 1991; Plungian, 2001; Faller, 2002). The classification developed by Willet (1988) is regarded as the most fundamental classification. According to Willet (1988), the types of evidence can be classified as follows:

Table 1. Willet's (1988) types of evidence classification

Direct		Indirect	
Visual			Second hand
Auditory		**Reported**	Third hand
Other Sensory			Folklore
			Results
		Inference	Reasoning

Similar to Willet's (1988) classification, Plungian (2001) classified evidence according to two categories: direct and indirect evidence. Emphasising that the types of evidence are based on the perception of the individual, unlike Willet (1988), Plungian (2001) suggested a new classification, one that included *personal* and *mediated* evidence. According to this classification, personal evidence is subjective and includes all direct types of evidence that the producer obtains through his or her perception or senses, and *reflected* evidence, which includes inference and reasoning. The mediated evidence, which is involved in the indirect type of evidence, shows the knowledge that the producer obtains not through his or her perception, but through transfer and quotation instead. Therefore, it contains not subjective, but objective elements.

Linguists such as Chafe (1986), Willet (1988), de Haan (1998, 2005) and Faller (2002) ranked the types of evidence in terms of their reliability. Chafe (1986), who was of the opinion that evidentiality and epistemicity modalities are associated with each other, stated that the reliability level of types of evidence can differ according to context, and suggested an evidentiality schema in which knowledge ranges between the most reliable to the least reliable, focusing on the concept of knowledge (Chafe, 1986).

Table 2. Chafe's (1986) Evidentiality Schema

Source of knowledge	Mode of knowing	Reliable	Knowledge matched against
??? ━ ━ ━▶	Belief ━ ━ ━▶	K N	Verbal resources
Evidence ━ ━ ━▶	Induction ━ ━ ━▶	O ━ ━ ━▶ W L E	
Language ━ ━ ━▶	Hearsay ━ ━ ━▶	D ━ ━ ━▶	Expectations
Hypothesis ━ ━ ━▶	Deduction ━ ━ ━▶	G E	
		Unreliable	

The order of the four elements included in the mode of knowing in the table above is not fixed. Each element can move up or down on its own axis. Therefore, depending on the context, second-hand knowledge can be as reliable as sensory-based knowledge (Chafe, 1986; Sargın, 2014). Moreover, Chafe's schema allows for comparisons among the different types of evidence to be made (Chafe, 1986). For example, the two sentences, "I saw Ayşe" and "I guess I saw Ayşe", both of which present information obtained through the visual senses, show a marked difference in terms of the reliability of the information (Sargın, 2014). In the first sentence, the reliability level of the information is high, while in the second sentence, the reliability level of the information decreases because of the adverbial clause "I guess".

According to Willet (1988) and de Haan (1998, 2005), who argued that epistemicity and evidentiality modalities are independent, the units of evidentiality range from poor reliability to strong reliability:

> *Personal evidence >> Direct evidence >> Indirect evidence >> Hearsay* (Willet, 1988)
> *Visual >> Non-visual >> Inferential >> Quotative* (De Haan, 1998, 2005)

Faller (2002), another linguist who made a distinction between epistemicity and evidentiality from each other, stated that evidentiality should be assessed in terms of the reliability of the types of evidence, not in terms of morpheme transference. Moreover, Faller (2002) stated that Willet's (1988) and de Haan's (1998, 2005)e ratings do not contain a universal value and suggested a universal classification including two different orders based on Plungian's (2001) distinction between personal and mediated types of evidence (Faller, 2002; Özmen Veld, 2006; Corcu Gül, 2010):

> Personal Evidence Order
> Performative>> visual >> auditory >> other sensory >> reasoning >> assumption

> Mediated Evidence Order
> Direct >> second hand >> third hand>>hearsay/folklore (tales, epic stories and the like).

This classification reveals that knowledge sources included in the types of personal evidence and mediated evidence show differences in their own right in terms of reliability levels. Moreover, similarly to Chafe (1986), Faller (2002) stated that the order presented above could change according to the context. In this respect, the hearsay evidence type can be unreliable in one context, while demonstrating high reliability in another.

The term evidentiality was commonly adopted in the Turkish literature on this subject, and the stance of the text producer towards a proposition was regarded as a modality category, as in languages such as

English. Furthermore, it was stated, that in Turkish, stance is encoded with verbs showing stance, means of modality morphemes, modal adverbs and adjectives (Underhill, 1979, 1985; Aksu-Koç & Slobin, 1986; Tura Sansa, 1986; Kocaman, 1988; Kornfilt, 1996; Ruhi, Zeyrek & Osam, 1997; Johnson, 2000; Gencan, 2001; Güven, 2001; Göksel & Kerslake, 2005; Özmen Veld, 2006; Corcu Gül, 2010, Sargın, 2014). In studies conducted by various linguists (Underhill, 1979,1985; Aksu-Koç & Slobin, 1986; Tura Sansa, 1986; Kocaman, 1988; Kornfilt, 1996; Ruhi et al., 1997; Johnson, 2000; Gencan, 2001; Güven, 2001; Göksel & Kerslake, 2005; Özmen Veld, 2006; Corcu Gül, 2010, Sargın, 2014), it was stated that morphemes such as *–DIr, -DI, -Iyor(DI), -mIşDI,* and *-mAkta(DIr)* indicate certainty in sentences and imply to the receiver that the text producer has first-hand, strong evidence of the reliability. According to these studies, the reliability levels of morphemes such as *-mIş, (y)-AbIl, -A/Ir, -mAlI,* and *-AcAk* are low, and indicate that the text producer has indirect evidence. Based on the previous studies found in the Turkish literature, Sargın (2014) prepared a classification showing the modal means of the evidential markers determined by Chafe (1986) for English that can be encoded in Turkish. According to Sargın's (2014) classification, the modality morphemes expressing stance in Turkish are grouped as follows:

Table 3. Sargın's (2014) Turkish Modality Morphemes Encoding Evidentiality and Their Functions

Modality Morphemes Encoding Evidentiality	Function
-mIş	-induction (coming to a conclusion based on evidence) -hearsay (knowledge obtained from someone else without witnessing)
-DIr	-induction (coming to a conclusion based on evidence) -sensorial evidence (direct knowledge gained through witnessing)
-AcAk	-induction (coming to a conclusion based on evidence) -deduction (making an assumption as a result of inference)
-mAlI	-induction (coming to a conclusion based on evidence)
-DI	-sensorial evidence (direct knowledge gained through witnessing)
-Iyor	-sensorial evidence (direct knowledge gained through witnessing)
(y)-AbIl	-deduction (making an assumption as a result of inference) -induction (coming to a conclusion based on evidence)
-A/Ir	-deduction (making an assumption as a result of inference)

Modality means play an important role in courtrooms, in which the reliability and the source of information are questioned and discussed (Szczyrbak, 2013).

The trial participants convey certainty or uncertainty regarding the reality of an event and its veracity with the aid of these interactional, linguistic means (Keisanen, 2007; Rivera, 2010; Grund, 2012; Szczyrbak, 2013). The use of evidential and epistemic uncertainty (stance) markers in courtrooms diminishes the participants' credibility, as well as reducing their cooperation with the investigator (Rivera, 2010; Grund, 2012).

When performing the literature review for the study, it was observed that the number of studies conducted that examine how modality morphemes expressing stance are used within the context of inquisitorial court discourse is limited in the international literature. Moreover, given that no studies investigating the use of such means within the context of courtroom discourse in Turkey were found, the necessity for such

a study arose. In accordance with this necessity, the present study investigates the distribution of modality morphemes expressing stances in the defendants' statements included in records of court hearings, and describes the text producers (defendants) stances towards the knowledge content presented in the statements by applying Chafe's (1986) model of knowledge types and Sargın's (2014) classification of Turkish modality morphemes.

Courtroom Discourse

Forensic linguistics, a new branch of applied linguistics, is the application of linguistic knowledge, methods and insights to legal and criminal issues. This new discipline involves various sub-disciplines, including authorship and mode identification, legal interpreting and translation, transcription of verbal statements, the language and discourse of courtrooms, language rights, statement analysis, forensic phonetics and textual status (Olsson, 2004; Coulthard & Johnson, 2007).

At present, the language and discourse of courtrooms has received much attention from linguists. As with legislative discourse based on written texts produced by parliamentary drafts people, courtroom discourse is formal, specialised, structured and, to a certain extent, non-reciprocal. Therefore, it is differs considerably from daily conversation and tends to be opaque to laypeople. Courtroom discourse does, however, have certain features that differ from those of legislative discourse, which is directive, impersonal and decontextualised. Courtroom discourse, on the other hand, is spoken, is interactive and consists of multiple accounts of stories that are elicited through a strict process of question-and-answer, turn-taking sequences (Atkinson & Drew, 1979; Cotterill, 2002).

A court is a governmental institution that settles disputes through a legal process. There are currently two globally accepted court systems: the adversarial system and the inquisitorial system. The adversarial system is used in countries that have adopted common law, such as the United States of America, England, Wales, Australasia and Oceania, South Asia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, South Africa and the Middle East. In this system, the judge acts as an impartial referee between the prosecution and the defence, and the lawyers play an active role. All evidence is presented through a process of oral questions and answers between lawyers and witnesses. This system has strict rules, and does not allow witnesses to present hearsay, introduce character evidence or prior convictions. Furthermore, in this system, the lawyers representing the opposing parties use language strategically in order to construct versions of the same reality on the behalf of their clients, as well as to defeat each other.

The inquisitorial system, which is based on civil law, is used in European countries, as well as in countries that borrowed their legal systems directly or indirectly from the European system, including the former Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc socialist countries, Poland, Romania, Latin America, Japan, Korea, China and Turkey (Farcasiu, 2007; Ainsworth, 2015). In this system, the judge is actively involved in investigating the facts of the case, and he/she constructs a legal narrative through written statements that are submitted by the parties prior to the court session. This system requires that the parties and defendant cooperate with the investigation conducted by the judge. This system enables all the participants, including the defendant, to be actively involved in pursuing the truth. Therefore, in this system, the defendant has a party role. The defendants can defend themselves and supply information to investigators. The lawyers take a passive role in this system, and are prohibited from asking the witnesses and defendants questions directly. Only the judge is allowed to examine witnesses, defendants and others involved in a case. The judge is responsible for asking the witnesses and defendants questions that have been posed by the lawyers, and then summarises the responses given by the witnesses and defendants and dictates them to the court clerk.

To date, a large number of courtroom discourse analyses (Lakoff, 1975; O'Barr & Atkins, 1980; Ericson et al., 1978; Bradac & Mulac, 1984; Hosman & Wright, 1987; Johnson & Vinson, 1990; Gibbons, Busch & Bradac, 1991) have been conducted on the adversarial system. They have focused particularly on the interaction and power dynamics at play in the courtroom. Kryk-Kastovsky (2006) described the

courtroom as a place in which interrogators exercise their power over the interrogated. According to this approach, courtroom discourse is known as power talk, and participants are seen as powerful or powerless based on their speech style, or powerless versus powerful speech (Liao, 2013; Johnson & Vinson, 1990). A powerless speech style is used by low status participants in the courtroom (lay witnesses and defendants), with the style exhibiting the following linguistic features:

1) Hedges (I think, sort of),
2) Intensifiers (definitely, really),
3) Hesitations (um, er),
4) polite forms,
5) Tag questions (isn't it?, are they?), and
6) Deictic phrases (over here, over there) (Ericson et al., 1978; O'Barr & Atkins, 1980, Rivera, 2010).

By contrast, a powerful speech style does not contain these linguistic features, and is used by high status participants (lawyers, expert witnesses). The powerful and powerless speech styles strongly influence the judge's and jurors' impressions, which in turn affect the result of a trial. The participants using the powerless speech style are perceived as less dominant, less convincing and credible, less socially attractive and more culpable than are the participants using the powerful speech style (O'Barr & Atkins, 1980; Johnson & Vinson, 1990).

2. Methodology

Research Design
In this study, the descriptive survey model was used to examine the role of stance modality markers in the defendants' statements. A descriptive survey enables the researcher to identify the characteristics of the observed phenomenon, as mentioned by Baškarada (2014).

Data
The corpus used for this study, comprising approximately 55,796 tokens, consists of fifty criminal court transcripts that were obtained from various law firms. In line with the aim of the study, the dataset selected for analysis includes the defendants' statements in the court transcripts. The sub-corpus consists of 22,199 tokens.

As stated previously, Turkey's legal system follows the inquisitorial system. Turkish jurisdiction does not allow tape recordings of court proceedings. Therefore, in Turkey, the sole source of court proceedings is the court transcript, which is an exact, unedited, written record of every word spoken, with each speaker indicated.

Data Analysis
As mentioned above, Chafe's (1986) model of knowledge types and Sargın's (2014) classification system of Turkish modality morphemes were used to analyse the role of stance modality markers in the defendants' statements. Quantitative and qualitative methods were applied to identify the frequency distribution of the stance modality markers used in the data. The corpus was examined using the NooJ linguistic engine module, which allows NooJ users to sort the words and to perform a morphological analysis on Turkish texts (Demirhan & Aksan, 2011; Bisazzsa, 2009).

3. Findings
The quantitative analysis of the corpus revealed that the modality morphemes expressing high credibility or certainty were the most frequently used type in the defendants' statements. The use of these morphemes occurred six hundred and thirty-six times (94%). On the other hand, the data showed that the

morphemes expressing low credibility or certainty were used less often. These types of morphemes occurred thirty-eight times (6%) in the data.

With regard to the frequency distribution of the morphemes expressing high credibility/certainty in the data, the findings showed that the -DI modality morpheme occurred three hundred and sixty-one times (57%) and occupied the highest position in terms of use, followed by –DIr, which was the second most frequently used morpheme (one hundred and eighty-two times, or 29%) in the defendants' statements. The remaining frequency distribution of the morphemes included the -mIşDI morpheme, which occurred forty-six times (7%), followed by the –mAkta(Dır) morpheme, which occurred thirty-seven times (6%) and, finally, the – ıyorDI morpheme, which occurred ten times (1%) and occupied the lowest position in the data.

Concerning the frequency distribution of the morphemes expressing low credibility/certainty, it was found that the highest ranking morpheme was the –mIş modality morpheme, occurring twenty-four times (63%), followed by y –Abil (fourteen times, 37%). AcAk, -mAlı and –Ir modality morphemes did not occur in the data.

The above results are illustrated in the following table:

Table 4. The Frequency Distribution of Modality Morphemes in the Defendants' Statements

Certainty Degree of Modality Morphemes	Modality Morphemes	f	%
High certainty		**636**	**94**
	-DI	361	57
	-DIr	182	29
	-mIşDI	46	7
	-mAkta (Dır)	37	6
	-ıyordı	10	1
Low certainty		**38.4**	**6**
	-mIş	24	63
	-Abil	14	37

The use of the –DI, –mIşDI and –ıyorDI morphemes, all of which communicate a high level of certainty in the defendants' statements, indicates that the defendants have   very strong, first-hand evidence in terms of the degree of reliability they impart to the receiver.

(1) ....A. adlı kişi aracı ile olay yerine gel*di*. 7-8 santimlik bıçağı çıkar*dı* ve üzerime doğru gel*di*. Bana saldır*dı*. Orada bulunan jandarma engel ol*du*.

(The person called A. came to the crime scene. He *got* the knife out, the length of which was was approximately 7-8 cm, and walked all over me. He attack*ed* me. The military police officer over there *avoided* the scene).

(2) …Yaklaşık 2 güne bir uyuşturucu maddesi kullanı*yordu*k. Suç tarihinde uyuşturucu madde kullanmak üzere B'nin evine gid*iyordu*k. Üzerimde yakalanan eroini akşam saat sekiz sıralarında al*mıştı*m. B'ye veya başkasına uyuşturucu madde satma*dı*m. Satmak için de bulundurm*uyordu*m….

(We were using drugs approximately every two days. On the date of the crime, we were going to B.'s house to use drugs. I bought the heroin found on me at around eight o'clock at night. I did not sell drugs to B or another person. I did not keep it to sell).

(3) Suç tarihinde sabah sekiz buçuk civarında yalnız olarak yürüdüğüm sırada arkadan başımın arkasına sopa ile vurul*du*. Ben döndüğümde karşımda diğer sanık A'yı gör*dü*m. Sopa kırıl*mıştı*. Ben bunun üzerine yere düş*tü*m. Akabinde A cebinden bıçak çıkart*tı* ve bana saldır*dı*.
 (On the date of the crime, at around eight o'clock in the morning, someone hit the back of my head with a stick while I was walking alone. When I turned around, I saw the other defendant, A. The stick was broken. I then fell. Later, A got the knife out of his pocket and attacked me).

(4) ….birbirleri ile ağız dalaşı halindey*di*ler. Bu şekilde birbirlerine saldırıyorlar*dı*...olaydan yaklaşık bir hafta önce O. ve Ş. arasında arazi nedeni ile kavga ol*muştu*.
 (They were fighting noisily. They were attacking each other. Approximately one week before the incident, O. and Ş. had a quarrel over land).

In the statements presented in (1) through (4), the morphemes–*DI*, –*mIşDI* and –*ıyorDI* mark the incidents that the defendants experienced and witnessed in person at a specific time in the past. Therefore, this shows that the defendants presented sensory (visual), evidence-based information, the credibility and reliability of which was high.

In addition, in the database, the morphemes –*DIr* and –*mAktADIr* were observed to have a factual/certainty value and to be used with the aim of explaining, determining and identifying a situation or a truth.
(5) Doğrudur, okunan ifade bana ait*tir*. (It is true, the statement read in here belongs to   me).
(6) A.Ç.'nin söylediği herşey yalan*dır*. (Everything that A.Ç. said is a lie).
(7) Reçete olmadan ilaç verilmesi mümkün değil*dir*. (It is not possible to sell medicine without prescription).
(8) İnsanların yargılanma haklarını almaya yönelik çirkin bir tezgah*tır*. (It is a sinister plan for people to take away their right to trial).
(9) Kayıtlar ve gelen yazılar benim savunmamı doğrula*maktadır*. (Records and texts verify my defence).

In the examples above, the morphemes in question make the personal stances of the defendants towards the information that they present clear, and make the opinions certain.

Moreover, the morpheme, –*mIş*, the certainty of which was low in the database, was observed to be used by defendants to state situations and incidents that they had not experienced; in other words, that they had not witnessed in person.

(10) Daha sonra benim aracıma zarar veril*miş*, ama ben görmedim. (Afterwards, my car was damaged, but I did not see that).
(11) …V. Başka bir olaydan içeri alın*mış*, serbest bırakıl*mış*… (…V. was taken into custody because of another crime, and released).

In statement (10), the morpheme –*mIş,* which serves the function of induction, indicates that the defendant reached a conclusion and made an inference based on observable evidence; for example, the damaged bumper of the car. In statement (11), the morpheme –*mIş* serves the function of hearsay-based evidence, and reveals that the defendant has obtained the information from someone else. In both usages, the fact that the defendants have obtained information about the occurrence of incidents indirectly, not through personal experience, is encoded, and the certainty and reliability of information is low.
Similarly to the morpheme –*mIş,* the morpheme –*Abil*, which displays probability in the database, encodes that the speaker has made an inference and has reached a conclusion based on observable evidence through the function of induction, thus, he or she is not sure about the information that he or she has given.

(12) …ben böyle bir senet almadım olsa idi geri vermezdim a. senedi kendi kendine hazırlamış ol*abilir*. (I did not take a note like this. If I did, I would not give it back. A. might have prepared the note by himself).

(13) …A. elindeki bıçakla boğuşma esnasında yaralanmış ol*abilir* benim elimde olay sırasında bıçak yoktu. (…A. might have been injured with the knife he was holding in his hand during the physical fight, I did not have a knife in my hand at the time of the incident).

In statements (12) and (13), by using the morpheme –*Abil*, the defendants have made an inference, based on information such as "with a knife in his hand", "I did not have a knife in my hand" and "I did not take a note", and the accuracy of the information is presented unclearly. Therefore, the certainty of the information is low.

4.   Discussion and Conclusion

In this study, the results obtained within the context of Turkey's inquisitorial court discourse were similar to the results obtained in previous studies (Keisanen, 2007; Rivera, 2010; Grund, 2012; Szczyrbak, 2013) that investigated the use of modality morphemes in adversarial and inquisitorial court discourse.

In contrast to daily language and other types of discourse, court discourse requires the use of formal, institutional, ritualistic and categorical language. The language used by the defendants and witnesses forms an impression in the judge's mind. Therefore, it plays an important role in affecting court case results (O'Barr & Atkins, 1980; Grażyna, 2014).

In agreement with the previous studies, it was found that the –*DI, –DIr, –mAkta(DIr)* and – *mIsDI* modality morphemes, all of which show certainty in the defendants' statements, are the most frequently used, in conformity with the prototypical formation of court discourse. In accordance with Grice's (1975:46) quality maxim, "Do not say what you believe to be false; Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence", the use of these morphemes shows that defendants, as text producers, provided true and certain information, which they obtained through their own experiences/senses, and assumed all responsibility for this information. It therefore shows that defendants prefer to use discourse that creates a perception of power, whereby they undertake to make judges believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, the accuracy of the information that they have presented, thus affecting the outcome of the court case. In other words, they seek to develop their power by means of applying such a strategy in the presentation of information within the context of court discourse.

Furthermore, similar to the previous studies, it was found that the –*mIş* and –*Abil* morphemes, which show low certainty levels, are the less preferred linguistic usages in the defendants' statements. It was observed that the defendants had recourse to such usages as a hedging strategy in the event that they did not wish to take direct responsibility for the information presented. In court discourse, where acquiring definite, accurate information is the aim, such usages are presentations that weaken the power of defendants and, consequently, reduce their reliability in the eyes of the judge. Therefore, these usages are thought to be the less preferred strategy for presenting information in the defendants' statements.

References

Aikhenvald, A. Y. (2004). *Evidentiality*. New York: Oxford.

Ainsworth, J. (2015). Legal Discourse and Legal Narratives. *Language and Law / Linguagem e Direito,* Vol. 2(1), 1-11

Aksu-Koç, A., & Slobin, D. (1986). A Psychological Account of the Development and Use of Evidentials in Turkish. In W. Chafe & J. Nichols (Eds.) *Evidentiality: Linguistic coding of Epistemology* (pp. 159-67). Norwood: Ablex Publishing Corporation.

Atkinson, J. M. & Drew, P. (1979). *Order in Court: The Organization of Verbal Interaction in Judicial Settings*. London: Macmillan.

Baškarada, S. (2014). Qualitative case study guidelines. *The Qualitative Report, 19*(40), 1-18.

Retrieved from http://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol19/iss40/3

Biber, D. (2004). Historical patterns for the grammatical marking of stance: A cross-register comparison. *Journal of Historical Pragmatics, 5* (1), 107–136.

Biber, D., & Finegan, E. (1989). Styles of stance in English: Lexical and grammatical marking of evidentiality and affect. *Text* (9), 93-124.

Bisazza, A. (2009). *Designing a NooJ module for Turkish*. Proceedings of NooJ Conference 2009.

Bradac, J. J. & Mulac, A. (1984). A molecular view of powerful and powerless speech styles: Attributional consequences of specific language features and communicator intentions. *Communication Monographs, 51*, 307-319.

Boas, Franz (1938) Language. In F. Boas (Ed.) *General Anthropology* (pp. 124-125). Boston/New York: D. C. Heath & Company.

Chafe, W. L. (1986). Evidentiality in English conversation and academic writing. In Wallace L. Chafe & Johanna Nichols (Eds.). *Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology* (pp. 261–72). Norwood, N.J.: Ablex.

Chafe, W. L., and Nichols, J. (1986). *Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology*. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex.

Corcu-Gül, D. (2010). *Tanıtsallığın durum anlambilimsel sunumu: Türkçede tanıt türleri* (Unpublished dissertation). Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü.

Cotterill, J. (2002). 'Just One More Time…': Aspects of Intertextuality in the Trials of O. J. Simpson. In J. Cotterill (Ed.). *Language in the legal process* (pp. 147-161). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Coulthard, M. & Johnson, A. (2007). *An Introduction to Forensic Linguistics: Language in Evidence*. London: Routledge.

Demirhan, U. U. & Aksan, M. (2011). *Tagset for NooJ Turkish module*. NooJ Conference 2011, 13-15 June 2011, Dubrovnik, Croatia.

Dendale, P., & Tasmowski L. (2001). Introduction: Evidentiality and related notions. *Journal of Pragmatics 33*: 339–348.

De Haan, F. (1998) The Category of Evidentiality (Unpublished thesis). University of Mexico.

De Haan, F. (2005). Encoding speaker perspective: Evidentials. In Z. Frajzyngier, D. Rood, & A. Hodges (Eds.). *Linguistic variation and language theories*. Amsterdam, Philadelphia.

Erickson, B., Lind, E. A., Johnson, B. C., & O'Barr, W. M. (1978). Speech style and impression formation in a court setting: The effects of "powerful" and "powerless" speech. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 14, 266-279.

Faller, M. (2002). *Semantics and Pragmatics of Evidentials in Cuzco Quechua* (Unpublished dissertation). Stanford University.

Farcasiu, M. (2007). Questioning patterns in the Romanian courtroom. *Scientific Bulletin of Politehnica, University of Timişoara Transactions on Modern Languages*, Vol. 6, No. 1-2, 23-28

Frawley, W. (1991). *Linguistic Semantics*. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Gencan, T. N. (2001). *Dilbilgisi*. Ankara: TDK.

Gibbons, P. A., Busch, J.D. & Bradac, J. J. (1991). "Powerful versus Powerless Language: Consequences for Persuasion, Impression Formation, and Cognitive Response," *Journal of Language and Social Psychology 10*,115–133.

Grice, H. P. (1975). 'Logic and conversation' In P. Cole & J. Morgan (Eds.) *Syntax and Semantics*, Volume 3 (pp. 41-58). New York: Academic Press.

Grażyna A. B. (2014). *Polish vs. American Courtroom Discourse: Inquisitorial and Adversarial Procedures of Witness Examination in Criminal Trials*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Grund, J. (2012). The Nature of Knowledge: Evidence and Evidentiality in the Witness Depositions from the Salem Witch Trials. *American Speech, 87*(1), 7-38.

Göksel, A., & Kerslake, C. (2005). *Turkish: A Comprehensive Grammar*. New York: Routledge.

Hosman, L. A. & Wright, J. W. (1987). The effects of hedges and hesitations on impression formation in a simulated courtroom context. *Western Journal of Speech Communication, 51*, 173-188.

Izvorski, R. (1997). *The present perfect as an epistemic modal*. Proceedings of SALT 7.In A. Lawson & E. Cho (Eds.), Stanford University.

Johnson, C. E. & Vinson, L. (1990). Placement and Frequency of Powerless Talk and Impression Formation. *Faculty Publications School of Business*. Paper 28.

Retrieved from: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/gfsb/28

Johanson, L. (2000). Turkic indirectives. In L.Johanson and B.Utas (Eds.), *Evidentials: Turkic, Iranian and Neighbouring Languages* (pp. 61-88). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Kareem, S. (2008). Linguistic and Extralinguistic Study of Evidentiality in English With Reference to Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby. *Journal of Al-qadisiya in Arts and Educational Science, 7* (1), 86-98.

Keisanen T. (2007). Stancetaking as an interactional activity: Challenging the prior speaker. In R. Englebretson (Ed.). *Stancetaking in discourse: Subjectivity, evaluation, interaction* (pp. 253–281). Amsterdam: Philadelphia.

Kryk-Kastovsky, B. (2006). Historical Courtroom Discourse. In B. Kryk-Kastovsky (Ed.). *Special Issue of Journal of Historical Pragmatics 7.2*.

Kocaman, A. (1988). Modality in the Turkish discourse. In Sabri Koç (Ed.), *Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Turkish Linguistics* (pp. 463-468). Ankara: ODTÜ.

Kornfilt, J. (1996). *Turkish*. London & New York: Routledge.

Lakoff, R. T. (1975). *Language and Woman's Place*. New York: Harper & Row.

Liao, M. (2013) Power in interruption in Chinese criminal courtroom discourse. In C. Williams and G. Tessuto (Eds.) *Language in the Negotiation of Justice: Contexts, Issues and Applications* (pp. 33–48). Farnham: Ashgate.

Lyons, J. (1977). *Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Barr, W. M. & Atkins, B. (1980) "Women's language" or "powerless language"? In S. McConnell-Ginet, R. Borker, & N. Furman (Eds.) *Women & language in literature and society* (pp.93- 110). New York: Praeger and Greenwood.

Olsson, J. (2004). *Forensic Linguistics*. New York: Continuum

Özmen-Veld, N. (2006). Anlamsal ve edimsel düzlemde Türkçede tanıtsallık. Dil ve Edebiyat Dergisi / *Journal of Linguistics and Literature, 3* (2), 1-23.

Palmer, F. R. (1986). *Mood and modality*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University.

Palmer, F. R. (2001). *Mood and Modality* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Rivera, G. N. (2010). *What dıd they say ın the hall of the dead? Language and ıdentıty ın the cerro maravılla hearıngs* (Unpublished dissertation). Unıversıty of Pıttsburgh Faculty of Arts and Scıences.

Ruhi, Ş., Zeyrek, D. and Osam, N. (1997). Türkçede kiplik belirteçleri ve çekim ekleri ilişkisi üzerine bazı gözlemler. *Dilbilim Araştırmaları*, 105-111

Sargın, M. (2014). Türkçede verilen bilginin kaynağına ilişkin tutumu belirten dilsel düzenekler. *Adıyaman Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, *7* (16), 366-393.

Simon-Vandenbergen A. M. & Aijmer K. (2007). *The semantic field of modal certainty. A corpus-based study of English adverbs*. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Szczyrbak, M. (2014). Stancetaking strategies in judicial discourse: Evidence from US Supreme Court Opinions. *Studia Linguistica Universitatis Iagellonicae Cracoviensis 131*, 91-120

Tura-Sansa, S. (1986). -DIr in Modern Turkish. In Ayhan Aksu-Koç & Eser Erguvanlı Taylan (Eds.) *Proceedings of the Turkish Linguistics Conference* (pp. 145-158). İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press.

Underhill, R. (1979). *Turkish Grammar.* Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Underhill, R. (1985). *Turkish Grammar.* London: MIT.

Willet T. (1988). A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticalization of evidentiality. *Studies in Language 12,* 51 -97.